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Abstract:  We investigate nutrient trading for point and non-point sources for the Bay 
Restoration Fund in Maryland.   We demonstrate how to use the proceeds from the tax 
revenue to mimic trading high-cost upgrades of sewage treatment plants for low-cost 
winter cover crops.  Under an optimistic assumption about costs for non-point sources, 
we calculate that abatement could be increased by more than 50%, while in a 
pessimistic scenario, abatement could be increased by 2%.   We also explore the role of 
uncertainty in determining the appropriate trading ratio between point and non-point 
sources of pollution, showing that the higher uncertainty associated with non-point 
sources should induce a lower trading ratio. 
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Introduction 
 
Recent initiatives in air pollution policy have emphasized the efficiency of incentive-
based mechanisms for reducing pollution.  The best example is the sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
trading program, although there are a number of other incentive-based programs in the 
Clean Air Act and its amendments, including pollution permit trading programs for 
mercury and nitrous oxides.
1 
  
  The success of incentive-based mechanisms in reducing air pollution has led to 
their use in water pollution policy, where progress has been more slow. The most 
familiar of these mechanisms is water pollution permit markets, which have 
considerable support from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and various state 
government agencies.
2  Breetz et al. list over 70 such programs in various stages of 
development (see King and Kuch and Breetz et al. for summary data on these 
programs).  Unfortunately, there have been only a limited number of voluntary trades to 
date, suggesting that there are barriers to be overcome if nutrient trading is going to be a 
viable water quality policy. 
 
  The requirements for water quality pollution trading are similar to those for air 
pollution permit trading.  The characteristics of buyers and sellers of permits must be 
determined.  Some of the buyers or sellers must be polluters who have pollution caps on 
an individual or enterprise basis.   The baseline levels of pollution emission of all sellers 
must be known.  Finally, there must be active monitoring and enforcement.  Since 
neither buyer nor seller of credits has any interest in whether the trade actually achieves 
the reduction in pollution, it is essential to have a public representative, such as a 
governmental agency, representing the public interest to ensure that the contract terms 
of the trade are reasonable and are met. 
 
  Water pollution comes from two sources: point and non-point.  Measurement of 
emissions is feasible for point sources, such as a publicly owned treatment plant, but a 
significant challenge for non-point sources.  The uncertainty that characterizes non-
point sources is all the greater because weather plays a major role in these emissions.  
Because the link between conservation practices and nutrient abatement is uncertain, 
trading such practices for point source abatement is a gamble.  Moreover, trading 
conservation practices instead of abatement greatly diminishes the ability of farms to 
seek more effective ways of nutrient abatement. 
 
  Much of the discussion of non-point source trading revolves around the notion 
of the trading ratio—the quantity of non-point source abatement traded for point source 
abatement.  The popular argument is that the trading ratio should be greater than one, to 
account for the greater uncertainty of non-point source abatement (King and Kuch). 
This conclusion is problematic, and stumbles on the distinction between abatement 
uncertainty and emissions uncertainty.  Shortle has observed that while increases in the 
                                                 
1 See Gayer and Horowitz for a comprehensive study of incentive-based pollution control policies 
2 The idea of nutrient trading for the Chesapeake Bay has circulated for some years.  See the general ideas 
suggested by the Chesapeake Bay Program athttp://www.chesapeakebay.net/trading.htm.   3
abatement of non-point sources at the expense of point sources may increase the 
uncertainty of abatement, it reduces the uncertainty of emissions.  Because ultimately 
the public is most concerned about the damages caused by emissions (and is willing to 
incur costs to reduce it), it makes sense in policy decisions to focus on emissions, rather 
than abatement.  Toward that end, Shortle identifies a trading ratio less than one as a 
tool for encouraging non-point source abatement and reducing the uncertainty of 
emissions. 
 
  In this paper, we investigate nutrient trading for point and non-point sources in 
the specific policy presented by the Bay Restoration Fund (Maryland Senate Bill 320), 
widely known as the Flush Tax, in Maryland.  The Flush Tax is expected to abate 
nitrogen emissions in the state by 7.5 million pounds, primarily from improvements in 
sewage treatment plants.  To put that reduction in perspective, there was a flow of 56.7 
million pounds of nitrogen into the Bay from all Maryland sources such as agriculture, 
urban non-point, and sewage treatment plants in 2002.  The 2020 strategy goals require 
a reduction of 20 million pounds, to 37.25 million pounds.  The 7.5 million pound 
reduction to be achieved by enacting the Flush Tax will accomplish one-third of the 
overall strategy reduction (Summers). 
 
  We demonstrate how to maximize the abatement of nitrogen emissions into the 
Chesapeake Bay from funds generated by the Flush Tax by trading high-cost upgrades 
of sewage treatment plants (POTWs) for low-cost winter cover crops.  We show that 
exploiting the heterogeneous nature of abatement costs for treatment plants and for 
agriculture could create substantial cost savings or increases in abatement of nutrients.  
Under an optimistic assumption about abatement costs for non-point sources, we 
calculate that abatement could be increased by more than 50%, while in a pessimistic 
scenario, abatement could be increased by 2%.  We also explore the role of uncertainty 
in determining the appropriate trading ratio between point and non-point sources of 
pollution to maximize improvements in water quality. 
 
  While it is encouraging to identify the gains that would result from exploiting 
differences in abatement costs, the barriers to effective trading are extensive.  We 
identify institutional and technical barriers that might prevent taking advantage of these 
opportunities.  We also examine the change in phosphorus loadings as a byproduct of 
nitrogen-based administrated trading decisions.   
 
The Maryland Flush Tax
3 
 
In May 2004, Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich signed the “Flush Tax” into law.  The 
Flush Tax, which began January 1, 2005, requires the owner or resident of each 
dwelling unit to pay an additional $7.50 per quarter on its water bill.  An annual fee of 
$30 is to be levied on homeowners with septic systems.  The fund has three purposes: 
                                                 
3 For a good summary of Maryland’s point source strategy to upgrade wastewater treatment plants to 
state-of-the-art enhanced nutrient removal (ENR), see Maryland Tributary Teams (2006).  The 
description of the Flush Tax in this section is taken from that document.   4
  to upgrade sewage treatment plants from biological nutrient reduction (BNR) to 
enhanced nutrient reduction (ENR), which are both methods that reduce 
nutrients from sewage, 
  to expand the use of winter cover crops, 
  to improve fund the improvement of homeowner septic systems that are located 
in areas designated as critical in the Bay tributary strategy. 
 
  The Flush Tax will raise approximately $60 million annually from users of 
POTWs.  Another $12 million will be raised annually from the estimated 420,000 
private users of septic systems.  Of that amount, 60% will go to refitting failing septic 
systems in critical areas of the state, and the remaining 40% to funding agricultural 
cover crops.  There are concerns, however.  The current levels of funding will cover 
only about 54 POTWs; an additional $161–$411 million will be needed to cover the 
remainder (Maryland Tributary Teams).  In addition, the open commitment to fund the 
full costs of upgrades creates an adverse incentive for the plants to design their own 
Cadillac version of enhanced nutrient management, perhaps exacerbating these funding 
shortages. 
 
  The vast majority of the funds will be used to upgrade sewage treatment plants.  
Specifically, funds will upgrade 66 major sewage treatment plants from biological 
nutrient reduction to state-of-the art enhanced nutrient reduction.  With BNR, treated 
sewage has 8 mg/l of total nitrogen.  With ENR, total nitrogen is lowered to 4 mg/l and 
phosphorus is reduced to .3 mg per liter.  The major sewage treatment plants designated 
to be upgraded have a minimum daily flow of 500,000 gallons and represent 95% of the 
wastewater flow from Maryland into the Bay. 
 
  Nitrogen and phosphorus caps (pounds per year) have been established for each 
individual POTW.  Each POTW has two different estimates of flow for 2020 (projected 
flow and design flow), as shown in their County Water and Sewer Plan.  Both estimates 
were approved by the Maryland Department of Environment in April 2003.  Design 
flow is larger than projected flow because it takes into account higher population 
growth projections.  
  
  The implication of these two flows is that, in the short run, a POTW that 
upgrades to ENR will be operating under its nitrogen and phosphorus caps.  But, as 
population grows in that municipality, reflecting the higher design flow, the POTW will 
increase its emissions of nitrogen and phosphorus until it meets its caps.  At that point, 
it would be allowed to trade with another POTW that is operating under its caps or 
purchase an offset to its emissions. 
 
  The aggregate nitrogen cap for Maryland is the sum of the 66 POTWs in the 
state, or 9,145,817 pounds per year of nitrogen (Table 1).  Sewage treatments plants in 
Maryland are dominated by the Blue Plains sewage treatment plant (the Maryland 
portion not associated with Washington, D.C.) and Back River sewage treatment plant 
(Baltimore City), which serve the two major population centers of the state.  Table 1 
shows the nitrogen released under BNR and ENR technologies and the costs of   5
abatement for ENR for the two large POTWs and the remaining 64 smaller POTWs.  
The two large POTWs are responsible for 48% of the nitrogen released into the 
Chesapeake Bay from controllable Maryland sources, and the cost of converting them 
from BNR to ENR will absorb 64% of the appropriated Flush Tax funds. 
 
Administered Nutrient Trading among POTWs 
 
We explore administrative trading, which is a more expansive version of nutrient 
trading than that allowed in the Flush Tax but more restrictive than would emerge under 
a market for nutrient emission permits.  We define administrative trading as an 
allocation scheme in which a responsible public agency minimizes abatement costs 
subject to the nutrient cap by allocating abatement to the cheapest sources.   
Administrative trading is motivated solely by differences in the average abatement 
costs.  To exploit the differences, we group the POTWs by trading areas (Table 2).  We 
consider three levels of trading: tributaries, watersheds, and state.  Ten tributaries are 
contained within four watersheds, and all are contained within the state.  Blue Plains 
and Back River were excluded from the trading scheme because they were too large to 
trade with the smaller POTWs.  They were assumed to have been upgraded from BNR 
to ENR.  Any gains from trading will be seen with the remaining 64 POTWs. 
 
  The trading works as follows.  Within a given trading region, we minimize the 
cost of meeting the aggregate cap by not upgrading high-cost POTWs.  We upgrade 
POTW’s from BNR to ENR beginning with the least cost, until the aggregate cap is 
met.  With the savings, cover crop acreages are increased.  This type of trading is not 
market-based, but administered by the government.  Efficiencies can be achieved across 
enterprises, but not within enterprises, reflecting cost savings from heterogeneity but 
not from incentives.  The greatest potential gains in cost savings, whether in a cap-and-
trade program or in a market economy, come from the ability of a firm to seek new and 
cheaper ways of meeting goals.  Frequently these cost savings involve innovations that 
were not apparent when there was no opportunity to save money. 
 
  The costs of abating nitrogen from sewage treatment plants are based on the 
annualized capital costs.  For each sewage treatment plant, we have the total capital cost 
of upgrading from BNR to ENR.  Under the assumption that the plant operates at 
projected flow, we calculate the annual reduction in nitrogen as a consequence of the 
upgrade.  The average annual abatement costs for the i
th plant are 
 
(1)  )] k k ( * q /[ ACC aac enr bnr i i pi − = , 
 
where AACi is the annualized capital costs,
4 qi is projected flow of wastewater, and kenr 
and  kbnr are the nitrogen concentrations for BNR and ENR (8 mg/l and 4 mg/l, 
respectively).  Note that this abatement cost equation assumes that the baseline for all 
firms is BNR, a condition that is currently not true.  This treatment omits variable costs, 
which are believed to be small but not zero.  We have written the cost equation for 
                                                 
4 Annualized under the assumption that the improvement will last 20 years, with an interest rate of 5%.   6
abatement from sewage treatment plants assuming that there is no randomness in the 
nitrogen emissions.  There is typically randomness because of weather or surges in 
loads, but these effects are small in comparison with randomness from non-point 
sources. 
 
  Table 3 shows the trading scheme for the Choptank Tributary.  The POTWs are 
ranked by the cost per pound for nitrogen abatement with ENR from low-cost to high-
cost plants, based on projected flow.  For example, the Cambridge POTW has the 
lowest average cost per pound of nitrogen, at $7.73, and Easton has the highest, at 
$32.65.  Trading involves upgrading low-cost plants to ENR and leaving high-cost 
plants at BNR, subject to not exceeding the aggregate nitrogen cap.  The aggregate 
nitrogen cap for this tributary equals 157,151 pounds per year.  By upgrading only 
Cambridge to ENR and leaving Denton and Easton at BNR, the sum of nitrogen 
emissions is still less than the aggregate nitrogen cap (i.e., 122,045 pounds per year is 
less than 157,151).  By not upgrading the Denton and Easton POTWs, $11,000,000 is 
saved.  We will explore the use of these savings to increase nitrogen reductions beyond 
the goals of the original Flush Tax.  As described above, decision making criteria are 
based on nitrogen.  Phosphorus loadings are calculated as a byproduct of these 
decisions.  We return to the problem of changes in phosphorus abatement later. 
 
  Table 4 expands the POTW-administered trading of the Choptank to all ten 
tributaries, four watersheds, and the state (excluding Blue Plains and Back River).   
Without any upgrades to the 64 POTWs (leaving all POTWs at BNR), 7,526,774 
pounds of nitrogen will be released at projected flow.  The first column shows the Flush 
Tax fully enacted with all POTWs upgraded to ENR.  At projected flow, 3,763,387 
pounds of nitrogen will be released, for a reduction of 3,763,387 pounds.  (The two 
numbers are identical because BNR assumes 8 mg of nitrogen per liter and ENR 
assumes 4 mg of nitrogen per liter.)  There are no savings because all funds are fully 
expended on upgrades. The average cost of reduction is $5.63 per pound of nitrogen. 
 
  When trading is allowed within a given tributary, but not across tributaries, 
4,423,115 pounds of nitrogen will be released at projected flow, for a reduction of 
3,103,659 pounds.  The reduction in pounds of nitrogen is less than when the Flush Tax 
is fully enacted, but it is still less than the nitrogen cap.  However, there are now savings 
of $103,142,760 that potentially can be used for nutrient reduction with lower 
abatement costs.  The average cost of reduction decreases from $5.63 per pound of 
nitrogen to $4.16. 
 
  As the trading regions increase in size from tributaries to watersheds to state, the 
reduction in pounds of nitrogen decreases (but is still less than the aggregate nitrogen 
cap), the savings in dollars increase, and the average cost per pound for nitrogen abated 
is decreased from $4.16 to $3.65. 
 
  Tables 5 and 6 explore the use of savings for other types of nutrient reduction 
activities such as winter cover crops.  Table 5 specifically examines the effectiveness of 
cover crops under different assumptions.  In particular, the effectiveness of cover crops   7
in reducing nitrogen is examined, along with the subsidy needed to induce a farmer to 
plant cover crops.  Time of planting is critical for the effectiveness of cover crops in 
reducing nitrogen.  In the Mid-Atlantic, for example, cover crops planted before 
October 1 are more effective than those planted after.  However, planting cover crops 
early requires the previous crop to be harvested without delays due to poor weather, not 
always an easy task. 
 
Nitrogen Abatement Costs with Cover Crops 
 
The costs for farms of abating nitrogen using cover crops are based on the costs of 
inducing farms to adopt cover crops and the productivity of the cover crops in abating 
nitrogen.  We estimate the costs by considering the efficiency of cover crops to reduce 
nitrogen emissions, conditional on the type of cultivation practiced.  That is, a nitrogen 
cover crop will induce more abatement on high-tillage corn than on low-tillage corn, 
because the high tillage crop begins with higher emissions.  The abatement costs are 
calculated as follows: 
 
(2)  ) e * k /( AP aac 0 i ef ni = , 
 
where aacni is the average abatement cost for the i
th non-point enterprise, AP is the 
adoption price per acre paid to farms to plant cover crops, kef is the proportional 
efficiency of cover crops in reducing nitrogen, and ei0 is the baseline level of emissions 
per acre for the i
th enterprise.  The baseline level of emissions is idiosyncratic, 
depending on such factors as the cultivation methods adopted by farmers, previous 
crops grown, soil type, slope, and weather.  In particular, the baseline will be lower for 
farms that have pursued environmentally sound cultivation techniques.  In Maryland the 
adoption price has been determined by political forces, the state of the budget and the 
immediacy of the environmental issues. 
 
  Heterogeneity of costs stems from variation in the efficiency parameter kef and 
the baseline level of nitrogen loss, ei0.  Early planting of cover crops yields efficiencies 
of 30%.  Late planting (after October 1) reduces efficiency to 15%.  Cover crops are 
more cost-effective when they follow a high-tillage crop, the baseline.  For example, an 
acre of high-tillage corn may lose 20 pounds of nitrogen to groundwater.  With the 
application of an early planted cover crop (30% efficiency), the reduction in nitrogen 
lost is 6 pounds.  In comparison, a conservation tillage crop of corn may lose only 15 
pounds of nitrogen.  Early planted cover crops (30% efficiency) reduce nitrogen losses 
by only 4.5 pounds per acre.
5   
  
  The current approach to allocating funds for the adoption of cover crops and 
other green practices fails to achieve the least cost for nitrogen abatement.  If farms 
were to adopt cover crops based on the costs of abating nitrogen, then offering a fixed 
price for enrollment would generate a least cost approach to allocating funds to this 
                                                 
5 Cover crop acreages and nitrogen loading data were taken from the Chesapeake Bay Program 
Watershed Model Output Data, Detailed Loads and Land Use Acreage, Edge Stream Load Land (details) 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/waterqualitycriteria/Loads_Landuse_Detail.xls   8
practice.  When farms have heterogeneous costs of adoption, as they almost certainly 
do, then we expect that AP would cover the adoption costs of the highest cost abater, 
giving the more efficient abaters surplus from the constant price.  In Figure 1, MAC 
represents the marginal abatement cost from planting cover crops.  It is created by 
ranking the farms from lowest to highest in terms of the costs of abating nitrogen with 
cover crops.  (In practice this curve would be a step function where the horizontal 
length of the step would be the farm’s contribution to nitrogen reduction.)  The 
marginal farm is just induced to plant cover crops at the price AP, bringing the quantity 
of abatement to N.  Other farms incur costs below AP.  The net gain to farmers from 
this method of subsidizing cover crops and abating nitrogen is the area ONM. 
   
  In the practice of subsidizing cover crops in Maryland other states, however, 
farms sign up for cover crops based on the cost of cultivating the cover crops, not the 
cost of nitrogen abatement.  For example, two farms that are identical except that one 
has a baseline of high-till corn and the other low-till corn would be equally eligible, 
though the high-till corn farm would have the lower cost in nitrogen reduction.  Hence, 
the actual practice of allocating funds to cover crops does not yield a least-cost 
approach to abatement. 
 
  Our method of calculating costs in equation (2), however, does a reasonable job 
of locating the most efficient non-point sources first.  Because we account for 
differences in baselines and differences in the location of farms, we have plausible 
estimates of the cost of abating nitrogen.  As with point sources, greater savings can be 
achieved with efficient mechanisms for allocating funds. 
 
  We test the sensitivity of costs to different subsidies.  We combine the subsidy 
level with differences in efficiencies to give some idea of the variability of abatement 
costs.    Variations in the subsidy level account for heterogeneity in the costs of planting 
cover crops.  Variations in efficiencies account for heterogeneity in baseline levels of 
emissions that depend on such factors as soil type, crops, cultivation technology, 
weather, and time of planting.  Table 5 shows an optimistic and pessimistic scenario. 
 
  The first column represents the use of the Flush Tax to upgrade all treatment 
plants.  Since there were no savings, it was not possible to subsidize cover crop 
production.  When trading is allowed at the tributary level, there are savings of 
$103,142,760.  In the optimistic scenario, this saving permits 331,340 acres of cover 
crops to be planted, resulting in an additional reduction of 1,882,336 pounds of 
nitrogen.  With the pessimistic scenario, there are fewer acres of cover crops planted 
and consequently a smaller reduction in nitrogen emissions.  As the size of the trading 
region increases, for either the optimistic or pessimistic scenario, more acres of cover 
crops are planted and more nitrogen reduced due to the greater level of savings created 
by not upgrading high-cost POTWs. 
 
  Table 6 shows trading among point and non-point sources by combining Tables 
4 and 5.  In the first column, nitrogen is reduced by 3,763,387 pounds per year by the 
upgrading of all POTWs from BNR to ENR.  The second column shows that by limiting   9
upgrading to only low-cost POTWs, a savings of $103,142,760 can be generated.   
However, if this money is used to plant cover crops, under an optimistic scenario 
1,882,336 pounds of nitrogen can be reduced.  Combining this with the reduction from 
the POTWs (3,103,659 pounds), then the cumulative reduction in nitrogen is even 
greater than that achieved with the Flush Tax (4,985,995 vs. 3,763,387). 
 
  In the most optimistic scenario and trading across Maryland, total nitrogen 
reduction increases by 53% or 2 million pounds annually over the level of abatement 
achieved in the Flush Tax legislation.  In the most pessimistic scenario, total nitrogen 
reduction increases by 2%, or 79,000 pounds annually.  In all cases, trading among 
point and non-point sources is more effective in reducing total nitrogen than is 




Accounting for differences in abatement costs demonstrates the savings available with 
the kind of administered trading considered here.  Given that this is not a true incentive-
based mechanism, it is possible that much higher savings would be available.  Even so, 




In trading at the most aggregated level of Maryland, we implicitly assume uniform 
mixing of pollutants.  Naturally, the broader the trading region the greater will be the 
gains from trading.  However, increasing the size of the trading region enhances the 
potential for “hot spots,” i.e., smaller areas that experience an increase in nitrogen 
pollution. 
 
  Consider the example of trading within the Choptank Tributary (Table 3).  If all 
POTWs were upgraded to ENR, then the annual load of nitrogen would be 92,171 
pounds.  When only the Cambridge facility is upgraded and the Denton and Easton 
facilities left at BNR, then the annual nitrogen load increases to 122,045 pounds.  But 
when the savings of $11,000,000 is invested in cover crops (optimistic scenario), it is 
possible to reduce nitrogen loads by 216,924 pounds per year (not shown), which far 
exceeds the amount emitted from the three POTWs.  This implies that the use of cover 
crops can reduce nitrogen loading from sources of pollution other than POTWs.  Yet the 
emissions of nitrogen for Denton and Easton from point sources increase from 29,874 
pounds when each facility upgrades to ENR to 59,748 pounds when the cover crops are 
used to help reach the cap for the two plants.  This may mean a local hot spot, 
depending on the location and hydrology of nitrogen from cover crops and the degree to 
which local emissions of nitrogen create local water quality problems. 
 
  When trading within tributaries is modeled (and the savings invested in cover 
crops), nine of ten tributaries have greater reductions compared to the reductions 
modeled when all POTWs are upgraded to ENR (Table 7).  However, only one-third of 
the POTWs are upgraded to ENR, while two-thirds are left at BNR.  This means that   10
while a given tributary is experiencing an overall reduction in nitrogen pollution, an 
individual city or municipality, in which the POTW is not upgraded, would not be.  As 
the trading size is increased to watersheds, there still exists the problem of the POTW 
for an individual city not being upgraded.  Nine of the ten tributaries experience 
reductions.  All watersheds have reductions in nitrogen pollution.  When the trading 
size is increased so that only the state level cap needs to be met, the number of POTWs 
that are upgraded declines further.  Three of ten tributaries have increases in nitrogen 
pollution, and one watershed has an increase in nitrogen pollution.  But the greatest 
level of nitrogen reduction is achieved when the cap is imposed at the state level. 
 
Phosphorus Emissions 
When the goal is to maximize nitrogen reduction given the funding from the Flush Tax, 
phosphorus reductions suffer (Figure 2).  One of the advantages of an “engineering fix” 
such as ENR or BNR is that systems can be designed to abate several nutrients at once, 
such as nitrogen and phosphorus.  It may be expensive but it is feasible.  The 
disadvantage of a “biological fix” is that it may not be feasible to abate more than one 
nutrient.  Cover crops are a good example.  They work well to inexpensively reduce 
nitrogen pollution, but not so well in reducing phosphorus pollution.  Figure 2 shows 
that trading high-cost POTWs for low-cost cover crops (optimistic scenario) may 
increase phosphorus emissions.  For example, when trading occurs across the state, then 
the nitrogen emissions are reduced to 47% of emission achieved with no trading, while 
phosphorus emissions are increased to 137%.  In essence, all tributaries, watersheds, 
and the state show an increase in phosphorus pollution compared to the reductions 
achieved by each POTW being upgraded to ENR so as to meet its nitrogen cap. 
 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is an important aspect of the debate about point versus non-point sources 
and eventually brings up the idea of the trading ratio.  The trading ratio is the number of 
units of non-point source abatement that must be provided for a one-unit reduction in 
point sources.  In the simplest of environments, where abatement of point and non-point 
pollution provides certain reductions in ambient levels of pollution and there is uniform 
mixing of pollutants from different sources, the trading ratio should be one.  The 
argument is then made that, because of the greater uncertainty in abating non-point 
sources, trading ratios should be greater than one.  For example, a trading ratio of two 
means that abating two pounds of nitrogen from a non-point source is equal to abating 
one pound of nitrogen from a point source.  King and Kuch suggest that the typical 
trading ratio lies between one and four.  Horan gives trading ratios between one and 
three.  The effect of a trading ratio greater than one is to make non-point sources more 
expensive and, other things equal, to restrict their use. 
 
  This argument appears solid only because it is based on what happens to 
abatement, not emissions.  To recognize the difficulty with this argument, we focus on 
the primary task of Bay pollution control, that is, reduction in emissions of nutrients.  
Due to weather, emissions are likely to be random.  We characterize randomness by   11
discrete increases or decreases in emissions.   By definition, these increases and 
decreases cancel out over time.
6 
 
  In the situation where a policy attempts to reduce the random variation of 
emissions as well as mean emissions, control measures should adopt a trading ratio to 
encourage the abatement of the more random emissions.  In the case of the Chesapeake 
Bay, emissions are more random from non-point sources than point sources.   This 
follows as long as greater abatement of non-point sources reduces the randomness of 
non-point emissions, an assumption that is reasonable.
7  When resources are devoted to 
abating non-point emissions, there are two gains:   lower mean emissions and less 
randomness.  With point source abatement, we get only reductions in mean emissions.  
Reductions in point source randomness is unchanged since it is defined as “relatively 
certain.”  However, more important, the randomness from non-point sources is left 
unchanged. 
 
  Consider non-point nutrient emissions from 1,000 acres of agricultural land.   
Each acre emits an average of 8 pounds of nitrogen, with an equal chance of emitting 4 
or 12 pounds.  The emissions from this farm will range from 4,000 to 12,000 pounds, 
with a mean of 8,000 pounds.  A local POTW has emissions of 15,000 pounds with 
little randomness.  Abatement costs are similar for the POTW and cover crops.  Total 
emissions from these two sources are 23,000 pounds, with a range of 19,000 to 27,000 
pounds.  When cover crops are used for abatement, the loss per acre is reduced to 5 
pounds, but with equal likelihood the loss can be 2.5 or 7.5 pounds.  The loadings from 
this farm will now range from 2,500 to 7,500 pounds, with a mean of 5,000 pounds.  
Total emissions from the two sources are 20,000, with a range of from 17,500 to 22,500 
pounds.  The use of cover crops has reduced the mean and range of emissions. 
 
  Suppose instead that we choose to abate 3,000 pounds from the POTW.  When 
the point source is adopted, we retain the randomness from non-point sources.  Total 
emissions from the two sources would now be 20,000, with a range of 16,000 to 24,000 
pounds.  When the non-point source is abated, we reduce both the mean and the 
randomness.   So instead of advocating for a trading ratio of greater than one, as 




  A counterpoint to this argument is that we have assumed that randomness of 
emissions cancels out over time.  However, the damages to the environment from these 
random emissions may not cancel out.  For example, it may be possible that a year of 
substantial loadings in the Bay will cause immense injury, while a year of an equal, 
                                                 
6 We view the problem ex ante but compound the possible uncertainties from different sources, such as 
weather, how well technology works, etc. into one uncertainty.  Malik, Letson and Crutchfield consider 
several sources of uncertainty. 
7 See Shortle 1987 for a mathematical proof of this assertion. 
8 This argument is predicated on the assumption that the randomness of the non-point system is viewed in 
aggregate.  In other words, the randomness of the emissions from the previous crop (e.g., corn) is not 
separated from the randomness of the abatement associated with the cover crop (i.e., winter rye).  When 
viewed over many years, the aggregate view is more appropriate.    12
offsetting decrease in emissions will provide only modest improvements.  If this is the 
situation, then a trading ratio of more than one may be appropriate, but not for the 
reasons most often given.  The counter argument to this observation is that the 
importance of uncertainty depends on the scale of the trades, which depends on the 
application.  To begin with, nutrient flow to the Bay is made up of human-induced 
emissions and natural contributions.  The current Chesapeake Bay agreement calls for 
reducing nitrogen from 285 million pounds to 175 million pounds.  In this context, the 
difference in emissions caused by uncertain non-point source emissions is quite small.  
From Table 6, we see that the maximum abatement from non-point sources is about 3 
million pounds.  Under current circumstances this amounts to less than one percent of 
total current nitrogen emissions.  This change in emissions represents an amount so 
small that curvature of abatement costs and—more important in this case—damages can 
hardly have a role in determining the exchange of non-point and point emission 
reductions.  At least from the perspective of uncertainty in nutrient emissions in the 
Chesapeake Bay, there is no reason not to trade point and non-point source abatement 
one for one. 
 
From Abatement to Ambient Water Quality: Agronomy and Hydrology 
One of the biggest differences between point and non-point emissions is the lag 
between changes in abatement and changes in the level of emissions into the Bay (see 
Phillips and Lindsey).  Increases and decreases in point source emissions are 
immediately transformed to corresponding changes in nitrogen in the Bay and its 
tributaries.  Depending on the means of transport of non-point emissions, non-point 
source abatement can take from days to decades to impact the Bay.  When nitrogen is 
part of surface water runoff, the lag time can be quite short.  Nitrogen that is transported 
in groundwater may take up to 50 years to reach the Bay, with a median lag of about 11 
years.
9  Given that about half of the nitrogen reaches the Bay through groundwater 
contribution to streams, this lag needs to be considered in understanding choices 




In this paper we present evidence that under an administered trading system, where the 
responsible public agency selects lower cost abatement, there are in principal savings 
that could enhance Bay water quality.  There are naturally barriers to these trades.   
These barriers are evident in the paucity of trading for nutrient abatement across the 
country.  Reducing the barriers to administered trading, such as we have analyzed, can 
provide some gains.  But the real gains, those that come from true incentive-based 
mechanisms, require substantial improvements in our scientific understanding of the 
connection between non-point source abatement and the reduction of nutrients to the 
Bay.  Despite the difficulty in obtaining complete understanding, it makes sense to 
continue to explore and develop opportunities to exploit differences in abatement costs 
either through administered trading or through the use of true incentive-based 
mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
9 These figures are taken from the summary document by Phillips and Lindsey.   13
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Table 1. Annual emissions of nitrogen as estimated in 2000, nitrogen cap projected 
for 2020 (based on enhanced nutrient reduction with design flow), and the capital 
costs of upgrading from BNR to ENR for sewage treatment plants in Maryland 
  Annual Emissions of Nitrogen (lbs/year)   
  2000 Total Nitrogen 
Load 
ENR N Cap  Capital Costs for ENR 
Blue Plains  3,367,631  2,066,108  $377,200,000 
Back River  4,529,473  2,192,803  $100,000,000 
64 smaller POTWs  8,681,877  4,886,906  $263,742,760 
TOTAL 16,578,981  9,145,817  $740,942,760 
Source: Maryland Tributary Teams and Levelev 
 
 
Table 2. Sewage Treatment Plants (POTWs) as Allocated among the Three Levels 
of Trading Regions: State, Watersheds, and Tributaries 
Maryland State: 64 POTWs (excluding Blue Plains and Back River) 
Watershed Tributary 
Eastern Shore Watershed (19 POTWs)  Choptank Tributary (3 POTWs) 
  Lower Eastern Shore Tributary (9 POTWs) 
  Upper Eastern Shore Tributary (7 POTWs) 
Potomac River Watershed (23 POTWs)  Lower Potomac River Tributary (5 POTWs) 
  Middle Potomac River Tributary (4 POTWs) 
  Upper Potomac River Tributary (14 POTWs) 
Western Shore Watershed (15 POTWs)  Lower Western Shore Tributary (6 POTWs) 
  Upper Western Shore Tributary (5 POTWs) 
  Patapsco/Back River Tributary (4 POTWs) 
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Table 3. Administered Trading in the Choptank Tributary among the Cambridge, 
Denton, and Easton POTWs 
Facility Capital  Costs 














Cambridge $6,000,000  $7.73  98,676  124,594  62,297 
Denton $1,000,000  $15.22  9,746  10,553  5,276 
Easton $10,000,000  $32.65  48,729  49,195  24,598 
TOTAL $17,000,000       
          
With trading          
Cambridge $6,000,000        62,297 
Denton (don’t  upgrade)      10,553   
Easton (don’t  upgrade)      49,195   
Notes: 62,297 + 10,553 + 49,195 = 122,045 lbs/yr, still less than the nitrogen cap (157,151 lbs/year). Total savings = $1,000,000 + 
$10,000,000 = $11,000,000. 
 
Table 4. Comparisons of Reduction in Nitrogen Released and Savings in Dollars 
when the Flush Tax is Fully Enacted with Three Different Sizes of Trading 
Regions 
  Flush Tax (no trading)  Trading: 10 Tributaries  Trading: 4 
Watersheds 
Trading: Maryland 
 Nitrogen  (lbs/yr) 
Projected flow, BNR  7,526,774  7,526,774  7,526,774  7,526,774 
Projected ENR/BNR  3,763,387  4,423,115  4,638,554  4,718,875 
Reduction 3,763,387  3,103,659  2,888,220  2,807,899 
Nitrogen cap (ENR, design 
flow) 
 4,886,906     
  Expenditures (life of project) 
Planned ENR  $263,742,760  $263,742,760  $263,742,760  $263,742,760 
Actual ENR  $263,742,760  $160,600,000  $137,600,000  $127,600,000 
Savings $0  $103,142,760  $126,142,760  $136,142,760 




   16
Table 5. Trading among Non-Point Sources (Cover Crops) with Different 
Assumptions 
  Flush Tax (no 
trading) 
Trading: 10 Tributaries  Trading: 4 
Watersheds 
Trading: Maryland 
$: Savings  $0  $103,142,760  $126,142,760  $136,142,760 
Optimistic: ($20 + $4 (admin) per Acre, 30% Technical Efficiency 
$: Cost/lb  na  $4.40  $3.85  $3.70 
N reduction (lbs/yr)  na  1,882,336  2,630,641  2,951,805 
Cover crop (acres)  na  331,340  414,049  455,511 
Pessimistic: $30 + $6 (admin) per Acre, 15% Technical Efficiency 
$: Cost/lb  na  $12.19  $10.83  $10.57 
N reduction (lbs/yr)  na  679,346  935,302  1,034,256 
Cover crop (acres)  na  228,772  281,368  303,674 
 
 
Table 6. Trading among Point Sources and Non-Point Sources 
  Flush Tax (no trading)  Trading: 10 Tributaries  Trading: 4 Watersheds  Trading: Maryland 
Actual  ENR  $263,742,760 $160,600,000 $137,600,000 $127,600,000 
Cover  crops  $0 $103,142,760 $126,142,760 $136,142,760 
Nitrogen Reduction (lbs/yr) from ENR and Optimistic Cover Crops ($24/acre, 30% technical efficiency) 
ENR  reduction  3,763,387 3,103,659 2,888,220 2,807,899 
Cover  crop  reduction  0 1,882,336 2,630,641 2,951,805 
Total  reduction  3,763,387 4,985,995 5,518,861 5,759,704 
Total  cost  ($/lb)  $5.63 $4.25 $3.84 $3.68 
Nitrogen Reduction (lbs/yr) from ENR and Pessimistic Cover Crops ($36/acre, 15% technical efficiency) 
ENR  reduction  3,763,387 3,103,659 2,888,220 2,807,899 
Cover crop reduction  0  679,346  935,302  1,034,256 
Total  reduction  3,763,387 3,783,005 3,823,522 3,842,155 
Total  cost  ($/lb)  $5.63 $5.60 $5.54 $5.51 
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Table 7. The Potential for “Hot Spots” for Nitrogen Reduction 
Trading within Tributaries  22 of 64 POTWs are upgrade to ENR 
  9 of 10 tributaries have greater reductions 
Trading within Watersheds  16 of 64 POTWs are upgraded to ENR 
  9 of 10 tributaries have greater reductions, one is increased 
  All watersheds have greater reductions 
Trading within State  14 of 64 POTWs are upgrated to ENR 
  7 of 10 tributaries have greater reductions, 3 are increased 
  3 of 4 watersheds have greater reductions in nitrogen, one is 
increased 
  The State has a greater reduction in nitrogen, and the largest 











Figure 1. Nitrogen Abatement 
 











Flush Tax (no trades) Tributary Trades Watershed Trades State-Wide Trades
Nitrogen Phosphorus
Figure 2. Nitrogen and Phosphorus Emissions across Several Different Trading 
Scenarios (point and non-point) Expressed as a Percent of the Flush Tax (no 
trading) 
 